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98 N.C. L. REV. 389 (2020) 
THE NEXT STEP: BUILDING, FUNDING, AND 
MEASURING PRETRIAL SERVICES         
(POST-BAIL REFORMS)* 
GLORIA GONG** 
Bail reform offers a tantalizing promise: individuals who cannot afford bail 
but who will show up for court and pose no public safety risk will be able to 
return to their homes, families, and jobs instead of awaiting trial in jail. Bail 
reform may reduce the concentrated costs the criminal justice system imposes 
on poor people and communities, avoid unnecessary imprisonment and its 
attendant harms, and allow local governments to redirect scarce funds away 
from the machinery of incarceration toward prevention and reinvestment.   
But to realize that promise, jurisdictions implementing bail reforms must 
navigate three implementation challenges that, unaddressed, threaten to 
undermine the reforms’ success:  
1) What system will local governments put in place in lieu of pretrial 
incarceration?  
2) How will they pay for it?  
3) How will they demonstrate to their stakeholders that the new 
alternative to pretrial incarceration is working?  
Courts and governments considering transforming their pretrial practices 
have access to a wealth of national expertise and resources directed at catalyzing 
reform. They have many fewer resources, however, aimed at supporting them 
through the administrative hurdles of setting up a new system to replace the 
one that has been jettisoned after reforms are adopted. Yet getting 
implementation right is crucial to realizing the promise of criminal justice 
reforms, and poor implementation risks unintentionally reproducing harms or 
triggering backlash.  
Over the past eighteen months, the Harvard Kennedy School 
Government Performance Lab (“GPL”) has begun receiving requests from state 
and local governments for support in implementing reforms to systems closely 
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intertwined with court debt—namely, bail and related pretrial practices and 
community supervision. Based on the GPL’s work, this Essay briefly outlines 
the key challenges most often overlooked by governments considering pretrial 
reforms: designing and implementing pretrial programs that avoid replicating 
the harms of traditional community supervision, identifying and realizing 
anticipated cost savings, and evaluating the success of pretrial reforms. Each 
section notes an initial set of approaches that may be useful to consider as well 
as areas for additional exploration. 
I.  GROWING CONSENSUS THAT CURRENT PRETRIAL PRACTICES ARE 
HARMFUL AND COSTLY 
The cost of money bail to individuals and communities is high. Whether 
individuals post bail directly or purchase commercial bail bonds and pay 
interest, individuals, their families, and their communities bear the financial 
burden.1 Those who cannot pay remain detained until trial and pay a different 
set of economic costs, including job loss and reduced earnings.2 And those who 
cannot pay remain detained until trial. Recent research has demonstrated that 
pretrial detention leads incarcerated individuals to plead guilty at a higher rate, 
increases both the likelihood and the length of incarceration, and is possibly 
criminogenic.3 Even short periods of incarceration can have harmful 
downstream effects, reducing labor force participation and decreasing receipt of 
benefits.4 The combination of effective advocacy, targeted litigation, and 
mounting evidence around the harms caused by the use of money bail is 
galvanizing jurisdictions across the country to consider sweeping reforms.5  
Results from some cash bail systems reforms have been very promising. 
New Jersey’s statewide shift toward use of risk evaluation and widespread 
elimination of cash bail resulted in a thirty-five percent reduction of the pretrial 
 
 1. See MATHILDE LAISNE, JON WOOL & CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, 
PAST DUE: EXAMINING THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHARGING FOR JUSTICE IN NEW 
ORLEANS 7 (2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/past-due-
costs-consequences-charging-for-justice-new-orleans/legacy_downloads/past-due-costs-consequences-
charging-for-justice-new-orleans.pdf. [https://perma.cc/XC3Z-FM9Q] (showing that, in the cases 
studied, defendants paid $6.4 million in nonrefundable bail costs). 
 2. See, e.g., Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM. 
SOC. REV. 526, 528 (2002). 
 3. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of 
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 715, 718 (2017). 
 4. Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, 
Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 201 
(2018). 
 5. E.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 492 (2018). 
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jail population.6 Evaluations in some jurisdictions that have begun to 
experiment with reducing or eliminating the use of cash bail have shown that 
an increase in individuals released on personal recognizance has not led to an 
increase in failures to appear or recidivism.7 
Launching bail reform requires government leaders to navigate several 
considerations, including shifting to a risk-based system, using risk-assessment 
tools, establishing ability-to-pay determinations, overhauling bail schedules, 
and responding to the use of commercial bail bonds in the existing system. Add 
to those considerations the resources required to push through the state 
constitutional amendments that have been necessary in some jurisdictions, new 
legislation, and shifts in judicial practice, it’s no surprise that the question of 
how to implement pretrial supports and services after reforms have been 
adopted is often overlooked. For bail reform to be successful, though, 
governments must not only do the hard work of decarcerating thousands of 
individuals, but they must also set up pretrial systems that do not replicate the 
harms of the cash bail system they are replacing. To support long-term reform, 
these pretrial systems must be not only operationally effective but also fiscally 
and politically sustainable. 
II.  PRETRIAL REFORM: IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Governments requesting pretrial implementation technical assistance 
from the GPL face three primary challenges: (1) designing effective pretrial 
supports and services, (2) identifying and capturing cost savings, and (3) 
evaluating and demonstrating impact. Below are key considerations for each of 
these areas, including a discussion of relevant tools that may present useful 
opportunities for governments to explore. 
A. Designing and Implementing Pretrial Programs That Avoid Harms of 
Traditional Approaches, Preserve Public Safety, and Maximize Freedom 
Reducing the use of cash bail may result in sharp increases in the number 
of individuals released from incarceration prior to trial. Jurisdictions may 
assume that the easiest response to individuals on pretrial release is to replicate 
community supervision (probation and parole) in pretrial services or even to 
directly expand community supervision agencies to house pretrial services. 
 
 6. GLENN A. GRANT, N.J. JUDICIARY, 2017 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE 
LEGISLATURE 4 (2017), https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2017cjrannual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U9Q9-8CGB]. 
 7. CLAIRE M. B. BROOKER, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., YAKIMA COUNTY, WASHINGTON 
PRETRIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS: PRE- AND POST-IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS 2 
(2017); Aurelie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Evaluating the Impacts of Eliminating Prosecutorial Requests for 
Cash Bail 1 (George Mason Legal Studies Research, Paper No. LS 19-08, 2019). 
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However, community supervision in its current configuration is often 
sprawling and costly and can create a slippery slope into continued criminal 
justice system involvement. In 2016, only fifty-seven percent of individuals 
exiting parole did so successfully; twenty-seven percent were incarcerated, and 
another three percent absconded or had an outstanding warrant.8 Chronically 
underfunded, community supervision agencies often rely on burdensome user 
fines and fees, which in some cases may interact with a “retained revenue” 
system that generates incentives for perpetuating fines and fees.9 Simply 
replicating probation and parole in the pretrial arena threatens to reproduce the 
shortcomings of community supervision systems and undermine the purpose of 
bail reform (to say nothing of bypassing important questions about whether 
supervision determinations prior to conviction can be treated similarly to those 
post-conviction). Rather than blindly replicating deeply flawed community 
supervision structures pretrial, jurisdictions building out pretrial services as part 
of bail reform should test new and innovative approaches that avoid the known 
flaws of traditional probation and parole. 
For example, governments working to replace these traditional approaches 
are implementing lighter-touch, resource-targeted strategies focused on 
preparing recently released individuals for successful reentry and reducing their 
chance of revocation.10 Innovations in the community supervision and pretrial 
space include replacing traditional systems of mass supervision with focused 
supervision that substantially reduces supervision intensity on low-risk 
offenders, which can mitigate deeper entanglement with the criminal justice 
system for these individuals.11 
In addition to reducing the harms of over-supervision, pretrial service 
agencies can actively experiment with supports designed to improve the success 
of released individuals. These might take the form of practices that reduce 
 
 8. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PROBATION AND PAROLE SYSTEMS MARKED BY HIGH 
STAKES, MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 9 (2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/research-and-analysis/issue-
briefs/2018/09/probation-and-parole-systems-marked-by-high-stakes-missed-opportunities 
[https://perma.cc/G6N8-BATN]. 
 9. COLUMBIA UNIV. JUSTICE LAB, TOO BIG TO SUCCEED: THE IMPACT OF THE GROWTH 
OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 4 (2018) [hereinafter 
TOO BIG TO SUCCEED], https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8709HV1/download 
[https://perma.cc/FF9F-TVUT (staff uploaded archive)]; COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 2 (2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brie
f.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNK6-S4JC]. 
 10. See TOO BIG TO SUCCEED, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
 11. EXEC. SESSION ON CMTY. CORRECTIONS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., TOWARDS AN 
APPROACH TO COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: CONSENSUS DOCUMENT OF 
THE EXECUTIVE SESSION ON COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 3–4 (2017), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/wiener/programs/pcj/files/Consensus_Final2.
pdf [https://perma.cc/YRJ3-WZTU]. 
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barriers to appearing in court—for example, text reminders of appearance 
location and time, transportation, and child care assistance. It could also involve 
innovative approaches to supervision that rely on contracting with local, 
community-based nonprofits rather than expanding existing community 
supervision programs. And finally, pretrial services agencies could explore ways 
to offer voluntary referrals to preventative services that might address 
underlying conditions, such as housing navigation, permanent supportive 
housing, and mental and behavioral health treatment. 
In Denver, for example, the GPL helped the city identify the costliest 
chronically homeless individuals who were also involved with the criminal 
justice system and provide them with safe, secure, long-term supportive 
housing.12 The program used innovative data tools to provide permanent 
supportive housing services—including subsidized housing, behavioral health 
services, and an Assertive Community Treatment Team—to individuals 
experiencing homelessness and frequent interaction with the criminal justice 
system.13 The program targeted individuals with eight or more arrests in three 
consecutive years, with three arrests marked as “transient,” meaning the 
individual arrested was likely experiencing homelessness at the time of arrest.14 
Interim project results have shown that the program has increased housing 
stability among participants.15 Although participation in similar services should 
not be linked with pretrial release conditions or detention determinations, 
intentional linkages and warm handoffs to preventative services may have the 
potential to interrupt cycles of involvement with the criminal justice system 
that are driven by underlying challenges such as housing instability or mental 
and behavioral health issues.16 The availability of high-quality voluntary 
 
 12. GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., DENVER PERMANENT 
SUPPORTIVE HOUSING PAY FOR SUCCESS PROJECT 1–2 (2017) [hereinafter DENVER PERMANENT 
SUPPORTIVE HOUSING], https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/files/govlabs/files/denver_psh_pfs_project_
feature.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT5A-R9TD]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. MARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., URBAN INST., FROM HOMELESS TO HOUSED: INTERIM 
LESSONS FROM THE DENVER SUPPORTIVE HOUSING SOCIAL IMPACT BOND INITIATIVE 5 (2018) 
[hereinafter HOMELESS TO HOUSED], https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99181/
from_homeless_to_housed_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FRR-M98T]. 
 15. Id. at 36 (reporting that eighty-five percent of the program participants retained housing 
without exits). 
 16. DENVER PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING, supra note 12, at 1–2. “Warm handoff” is a 
term (and practice) borrowed from the healthcare field. See Christine A. Pace et al., Warm Handoffs 
and Attendance at Initial Integrated Behavioral Health Appointments, 16 ANNALS FAM. MED. 346, 346 
(2018) (behavioral healthcare); Warm Handoff: Intervention, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & 
QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov/patient-safety/reports/engage/interventions/warmhandoff.html 
[https://perma.cc/7KYT-AYPN] (primary healthcare). In the social services context, warm handoffs 
refer to practices that connect clients to services in a more intentional way. Compared to referrals in 
which clients are responsible for outreach and enrolling, warm handoffs typically involve some level of 
contact from a social worker, case manager, or equivalent who helps the client contact the service 
provider to initiate enrollment and may provide information about the client to the provider. 
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preventative services might also encourage judges to shift away from costly and 
ineffective conditions, such as drug testing. 
B. Funding and Cost Capture: Can Pretrial Systems Be Funded by Cost Savings 
from Bail Reform? How Much Do Reforms Actually Save and Can Those 
Savings Be Recovered? 
One of the key questions facing governments seeking to implement 
pretrial reforms is how the pretrial services replacing incarceration will be 
funded. Pretrial reform advocates often raise cost savings as a supporting 
rationale for undertaking bail reform or even as a potential mechanism for 
broader community reinvestment.17 However, reforms do not automatically 
translate into savings. We see jurisdictions making two types of common errors 
in anticipating reform-generated savings: conflating average and marginal costs 
in a way that likely overestimates the magnitude of potential savings and failing 
to determine whether project cost savings can actually be recouped. 
1.  How Much Do Reforms Actually Save? 
Predictions of potential savings generated by pretrial reforms often 
overestimate the value of savings. One of the most common mistakes is 
conflating average and marginal cost.18 Savings estimates may calculate savings 
as a function of reduction in jail usage and the average cost of incarceration, but 
this approach ignores that funding is often committed in ways that do not scale 
down with marginal decreases in use. In fact, the average amount spent on 
incarcerating an individual for a day is very different than the amount of money 
saved if that individual is not incarcerated for one day. The costs of 
 
 17. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST? 5 (2017), 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey
=4c666992-0b1b-632a-13cb-b4ddc66fadcd&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/CMD7-34JB]. 
 18. See, e.g., BUCKEYE INST., THE FACTS: A COST SAVINGS ANALYSIS OF BAIL REFORM 1–3 
(2018), https://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/library/docLib/2018-03-30-The-Facts-A-Cost-Savings-
Analysis-of-Bail-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9G2-Q6CZ]. The analysis calculates savings by 
multiplying average incarceration costs by the projected number of released individuals. Id. at 1–2. 
However, the average costs used are based on costs reported by the Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction and appear to include the full costs of expenditures on jails, which means that only a small 
fraction of those costs would translate into savings as the jail population is reduced incrementally. 
ROBERT MEEKER, OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, FISCAL NOTE & LOCAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT 2–3 (2018), https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/download?key=9107&format=pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JBK5-FWRD]. The Buckeye Institute’s analysis was prominently cited in the Ohio 
State Supreme Court’s Bail Task Force’s recommendation to reform Ohio’s bail system. See OHIO 
SUPREME COURT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO TASK 
FORCE TO EXAMINE THE OHIO BAIL SYSTEM 2 (2019), http://www.sc.ohio.gov/Publications/
bailSys/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETT3-RUNH]. My point is not that the task force’s 
recommendations were not sound, but that reformers often rely on analyses that are likely overstating 
the value of savings that will be generated by reforms—or, at the very least, will only come true should 
reforms generate full decarceration. 
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incarceration are likely locked into buildings, staff, and service contracts. In 
other words, jails continue to function even when prison populations decline. 
Reducing jail usage by pretrial detainees does not dent the fixed costs of running 
a jail; depending on the jail, marginal savings may be primarily generated from 
reductions in health care treatments, meals, laundry, or other services that are 
paid for on a per-unit basis. To realize larger savings, reforms would need to 
reduce jail populations by sufficient amounts to allow the fixed costs of physical 
and systems infrastructure to be recouped—closure of buildings or wings, 
reduction in staff, and renegotiation of service contracts at a lower amount.19 
Because of these “cliff points”—that is, the point at which the potential savings 
increase sharply because of the ability to recoup previously fixed costs—
jurisdictions often do not stand to see significant savings until there are 
substantial reductions in incarceration rates overall. However, practitioners and 
decisionmakers who misunderstand this point may assume that any reductions 
in incarceration will yield the “average” amount of savings, leading them to 
either overestimate savings or underestimate the scale of decarceration 
necessary to achieve the desired projected savings. 
2.  Can Cost Savings Actually Be Realized? 
The second important question for jurisdictions to address is whether cost 
savings, even if correct, can actually be recouped. Even if savings are real, 
jurisdictions may need to create innovative approaches to realize savings across 
siloed agencies and over time. Local analysis is needed to determine whether 
budgets will in fact see savings; if jail budgets are largely tied up in 
infrastructure and labor contracts, reductions in jail usage may not automatically 
yield significant savings. Jurisdictions seeking to capture cost savings face the 
“wrong pockets” problem, where the agency paying for the intervention is not 
the one where the benefits accrue.20 In the case of bail reform, jurisdictions will 
have to figure out how to bridge the gap between pretrial services administered 
by courts or pretrial services agencies and the jail or sheriffs’ budgets that realize 
savings from reduced jail usage. 
 
 19. The financial model of the Pay for Success (“PFS”) contract used by the state of New York 
in its criminal justice PFS project advised by the GPL gives an example of calculations of cost savings 
that take into account the “cliff points” at which reductions in incarceration would allow greater savings 
to be generated by allowing the state to unwind larger spending areas, such as maintaining prison wings 
or whole prisons. See New York State Criminal Justice Re-Entry Services, GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB, 
HARV. KENNEDY SCH., https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/new-york-state-criminal-justice-re-entry-
services [https://perma.cc/9K87-QZDL]; PAY FOR SUCCESS INTERMEDIARY AGREEMENT (Oct. 1, 
2013), https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/files/govlabs/files/nys_ceo_pfs_contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H3KS-UWF2]. 
 20. See JOHN K. ROMAN, URBAN INST., SOLVING THE WRONG POCKETS PROBLEM: HOW 
PAY FOR SUCCESS PROMOTES INVESTMENT IN EVIDENCE-BASED BEST PRACTICES 2 (2015), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/71501/2000427-solving-the-wrong-pockets-
problem_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/39W2-ZMPK]. 
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The wrong-pockets problem stands as a potential barrier to capturing cost 
savings effectively. When one agency underwrites the cost of an intervention, 
and the intervention yields benefits in a different agency, separate budgets, 
authority, and interests may prevent the savings from being captured by the 
beneficiary agency. This is particularly an issue if the savings were intended to 
offset the cost of the intervention. For example, if spending by a probation 
agency reduced recidivism drastically, but the cost savings from reduced 
incarceration all accrued to a separate department of corrections overseeing 
prisons, it is not a given that the intervention—even though successful—will 
have self-generated funding to continue unless the probation agency can find a 
way to convince the corrections agency or a central decisionmaker to 
redistribute the savings.  
New Jersey’s bail reform efforts resulted in a near-complete elimination of 
cash bail and a thirty-five percent reduction of the pretrial jail population.21 
However, program administrators identified lack of funding for the 
administration of pretrial services in the first year as a serious threat to the 
sustainability of the changes.22 A report by the New Jersey Judiciary on the 
initial outcomes of the program flagged a “substantial annual structural deficit” 
as a major cause for concern and noted that unless corrected, pretrial services 
expenses would outstrip revenues a little more than a year into the reform.23 
Another challenge is that benefits may accrue over time, but pretrial 
services agencies will need upfront funding to pay for their services. For 
example, reforms instituted today may create savings next year. Jurisdictions 
wishing to pay for pretrial services from cost savings must find methods to 
minimize the delay between the upfront spending required to set up the pretrial 
services bail and other pretrial reforms and the future generated savings. 
Finally, savings may accrue in ways that are not technically or politically 
feasible to realize. For example, as jail populations decrease, jails may need 
fewer staff. However, contracts, union stipulations, or political ramifications of 
reducing staffing may bar jurisdictions from cutting staff in step with reduced 
jail populations. 
Some jurisdictions may experiment with ways to recoup fixed costs by 
renting out jail beds to neighboring locales or to other agencies. These 
approaches may allow additional recovery of costs that otherwise would have 
been fixed. Yet, bed rentals function to recoup costs by continuing to incarcerate 
individuals and may simply shift the site of the cost and jurisdiction for 
incarceration. 
 
 21. See GRANT, supra note 6, at 4. 
 22. See id. at 25. 
 23. See id. 
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In our experience with assisting state and local governments in calculating, 
tracking, and realizing cost savings through Pay for Success (“PFS”) 
contracting,24 recovering savings generated by preventative interventions 
requires some combination of the following conditions. 
a. Central Budget Authority  
A central budget authority, such as a state budget agency, can resolve the 
wrong-pockets challenge by allocating resources across the system. Although 
individual agencies do not have incentives to create savings for other agencies, 
budget offices are able to look across agencies to see how spending in one area 
saves the state government money, even if savings accrue in a neighboring 
agency or in the future. Central budget authorities, mainly legislatures, can 
authorize or fund preventative spending that will generate savings that the 
implementing agency could not capture alone. 
b. Ability To Calculate and Track Cost Savings  
Calculating and tracking cost savings puts government innovators in a 
position to be able to justify preventative interventions from a dollars-and-cents 
perspective. In order to do so, agencies must build the data and analytic capacity 
to calculate and track the value of savings generated. 
c. Ability To Count Social and Public Value Generated  
Many interventions may prove more costly than the amount of savings 
that governments are able to recoup. However, since most interventions have 
policy rationales, agencies that develop the ability to reflect a realistic and 
rigorously calculated public and social value of an intervention have an 
additional tool to persuade central budget authorities to shift funding toward 
preventative interventions or reform efforts. 
d. Ability To Make Changes in Spending on Infrastructure, Personnel, and 
Contracted Services  
Agencies are unlikely to be able to capture significant cost savings by 
reducing staffing, closing a wing of a jail, or shifting contracts because they lack 
the authority to make such decisions. One underexplored area is whether jails 
and other agencies that will see reduced utilization under pretrial reforms can 
 
 24. PFS contracting (or social impacts bonds) is a contracting model that allows governments to 
shift toward performance-based contracts with social service providers. In traditional PFS contracts, 
governments create a performance contract with a social service provider or an intermediary. Third-
party investors loan funding to the project to cover the operating costs of delivering services. If the 
service proves successful and delivers pre-agreed upon results, the government makes payments that 
are used to repay the operating loan. If the services are not successful, the government does not pay 
for the services and the investors lose their capital. 
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innovate ways to shift internal budgets toward agency-funded preventative or 
pretrial services. For example, a sheriff’s office experiencing sharp declines in 
jail populations might not be able to reduce staffing due to staffing contract 
structures but might be able to reallocate staff toward diversion, community 
service navigation, or other pretrial-related services. These types of shifts may 
prove to be more feasible than straight cost recapture and could allow 
jurisdictions another path toward funding pretrial or criminal justice reform 
interventions. 
The GPL’s work in PFS contracts and in helping jurisdictions shift toward 
preventative spending has sparked some creative approaches to contracting 
structures, redeployment of resources, and community reinvestment. This is 
one area in which we are particularly eager to create new solutions.25 
C. Evaluating Programs and Demonstrating Success to Stakeholders 
Finally, long-term success for bail reform will depend on elected officials, 
judges, law enforcement, and constituents believing that the reforms have been 
good for their communities. In addition to responding to misleading 
information from entrenched interests26 and effectively communicating the 
stories of affected individuals and communities, jurisdictions should prioritize 
the capacity to identify and demonstrate the impact of reforms on outcomes 
such as cost savings and public safety. This allows actors with often misaligned 
incentive structures to lend ongoing support.27 Jurisdictions implementing bail 
reform should institute two types of measurement—rigorous evaluations to 
 
 25. See generally GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., SOCIAL IMPACT 
BONDS 101 (2017), https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/files/govlabs/files/sibs_101_gpl_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5YWP-3DG4] (discussing how governments across the country are testing the Pay 
for Success approach). 
 26. Bail bond companies have been relentless in their efforts to stymie bail reform. See, e.g., John 
Buntin, The Fight To Fix America’s Broken Bail System, GOVERNING (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-bail-reform-texas-new-jersey.html 
[https://perma.cc/F2LT-CFA9]; Sheila Cohen, Bail Bond Industry Fights Back Against Moves To Limit 
or End Cash Bail, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 21, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.wpr.org/bail-bond-
industry-fights-back-against-moves-limit-or-end-cash-bail [httsp://perma.cc/5BZR-Z9S5]; Jon 
Schuppe, Civil Rights Groups Want To Put Bail Bond Industry on Death Row, NBC (Jan. 17, 2018, 6:42 
PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/civil-rights-groups-want-put-bail-bond-industry-
death-row-n838531 [https://perma.cc/4FW6-BE9N]. 
 27. Building in a comprehensive impact evaluation is one of the most straightforward ways to 
embed learning into a project. In the Denver project mentioned previously, a five-year randomized 
control trial was rolled out alongside the project, generating one of the longest and most rigorous 
studies of supportive housing in the country. DENVER PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING, supra 
note 12, at 2; HOMELESS TO HOUSED, supra note 14, at 9–10. Even prior to the evaluation’s end, 
interim results showing success now provide robust justification for continued service delivery. 
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determine the efficacy of the reform and real-time data measurement to allow 
the government to identify areas for improvement and respond immediately.28 
GOING FORWARD 
Over the next year, the GPL will select a handful of jurisdictions to 
collaborate with on developing and piloting solutions to key implementation 
challenges related to bail and pretrial reform. We will report back in the future 
on the lessons we learn as we attempt to carry the promise of bail reform 
forward through implementation.  
 
 28. As a field-tested example of how state and local governments can shift their traditional use of 
data toward practices that allow for timely identification of problems, continuous improvement, and 
transformative systems change, see generally GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB, HARVARD KENNEDY 
SCH., ACTIVE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: HOW GOVERNMENTS CAN COLLABORATE MORE 
EFFECTIVELY WITH SOCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS TO ACHIEVE BETTER RESULTS, 
https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/files/govlabs/files/active_contract_management_brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T43X-CXDK]. 
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